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On The Meaning of Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle 




The “consumer welfare” principle for antitrust law suggests that antitrust has 
something to do with the welfare of consumers. But what exactly is the meaning of 
“consumer welfare” in antitrust, and what are its signposts? Robert Bork popularized the 
term in the 1960s, and expanded on his definition in The Antitrust Paradox in 1978.1 During 
that period others occasionally used the term in debate over antitrust’s goals, although the 
definition was never very clear. 2 
 
Bork’s main contribution to the consumer welfare debate was to give the term a more 
singular meaning, which was unfortunately also a misnomer. He defined “consumer welfare” 
in antitrust as referring to “the wealth of the nation,” by which he meant the sum of consumer 
and producer welfare. There is nothing inherently wrong about defining welfare by a 
standard that aggregates the surplus of all participants in the economy, producers as well as 
consumers. Neoclassical economics generally speaks of welfare in such terms. Bork, 
however, used the term “consumer welfare” to describe something that most economists 
refer to as “general welfare” or “total welfare.” At least for those who are not familiar with 
this debate, the rhetoric of consumer welfare in antitrust has suffered from a critical 
ambiguity ever since. For example, even today some Progressive critics deride the 
“consumer welfare” standard by equating it with Robert Bork,3 apparently not realizing that 
what consumer welfare means today is entirely different from Bork’s understanding. 
 
For most people familiar with the term today, “consumer welfare” refers to the 
aggregate welfare of consumers as consumers, disregarding the welfare of producers. Part 
of the ambiguity about the meaning of consumer welfare lies with the model of perfect 
competition that was Bork’s starting point. Under perfect competition, both general welfare 
and consumer welfare are maximized, so there is no difference between them. Under perfect 
competition, consumer prices are minimized and output is maximized but returns are 
limited to the competitive level. However, antitrust policy is concerned with states of the 
economy that are imperfect. Otherwise, there would be no need for antitrust. As soon as we 
 
* James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania School of Law and 
The Wharton School 
1 Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 242 (Supp. May 1967); Robert H. 
Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L.J. 950 (1968); Robert H. 
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division I, 74 Yale 
L.J. 775 (1965); II, 75 Yale LJ 373 (1965). See also Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A 
Policy at War With Itself (1978). 
2See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics, and the Search for 
Humanistic Value, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1155 (1972) (identifying the economic approach to antitrust 
as “the maximization of producer and consumer welfare”).  
3 E.g., David Dayen, “The Rehabilitation of Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Dec. 22, 2017, 
available at https://prospect.org/economy/rehabilitation-antitrust/. 
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assume the existence of imperfections, or of some monopoly in the economy, Bork’s 
definition and the definition of consumer welfare that we use today can mean very different 
things. 
Bork adopted (with minor variations) the “welfare tradeoff” model developed by 
Oliver Williamson. Williamson also began with a model of perfect competition and a general 
welfare test for antitrust legality. A practice such as a merger or joint venture might 
simultaneously increase the sellers’ market power and reduce their costs. Under the tradeoff 
model, a practice would be deemed a welfare improvement if the cost savings to producers 
exceeded the harm to consumers. As a result, “consumer welfare” in Bork’s understanding 
could be improved by a practice that actually harmed consumers by causing a price increase, 
provided that the benefits to producers were even greater. 
Bork also made clear – again borrowing from Williamson — that in assessing the 
welfare consequences of an antitrust event such as a merger, a relatively small gain in 
producer efficiency would be enough to offset a rather large price increase. Using 
Williamson’s assumptions, which he regarded as typical, a producer cost reduction of 4% 
would likely be sufficient to offset a price increase of 20% and still be welfare neutral or 
positive.4 Williamson also assumed that a pure wealth transfer – that is, something that 
enriched producers and impoverished consumers by exactly the same amount — was a 
“matter of indifference.” (pp. 27-28). Because antitrust law evaluates changes at the margin, 
by looking at the incremental impact of a practice, these premises effectively ensured that 
producer gains would play a much larger role in antitrust evaluation than did gains to 
consumer as consumers. This approach to antitrust measures of welfare is very likely at least 
partly to blame for the fact that price-cost margins in the United States have been steadily 
increasing over the past several decades. 
 
Because higher prices entail lower output, under the Williamson/Bork model a 
practice, could be said to improve consumer welfare even if the practice serves to decrease 
market output — a point that Williamson illustrated graphically in his article on the welfare 
tradeoff (p. 21), and that Bork repeated (Paradox, p. 107). What Bork did not pursue is a 
difficult but nevertheless pervasive question: how common are practices that actually 
reduce output but nevertheless produce efficiency gains so substantial as to outweigh 
consumer losses? The largest source of production efficiency gains is economies of scale. But 
scale economies usually result from higher rather than lower output. To be sure, some 
efficiencies can be attained at lower output: firms might modernize plants or re-allocate 
production among multiple plants, streamline distribution, acquire valuable intellectual 
property rights, hire more capable managers, and the like. But many of these types of gains 
are readily achievable through means other than the challenged antitrust practice. 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines take an appropriate response to consideration of 
efficiencies: they will be countenanced only if no tradeoff is necessary: that is, assuming that 
 
4Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 18, 22 (1968).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525385
Hovenkamp Consumer Welfare Jan. 2020 
Page 3 
 
the merger creates an opportunity for the exercise of market power, offsetting efficiencies 
must be sufficiently large that the resulting profit-maximizing price is no higher than it was 
prior to the merger. In that case, there will be gains to producers but no losses to consumers 
and there is nothing to trade-off. 
Most of the literature on the antitrust consumer welfare standard assumes that the 
variable of interest is price: other things being equal, an increase in consumer welfare occurs 
if the price falls, and a decrease in consumer welfare occurs if the price rises. This creates a 
certain amount of awkwardness when we look at things such as monopsony, or monopoly 
power exercised on the buying side. For example, wage suppression might be thought of as 
producing lower prices, but does that give antitrust policy a goal of keeping wages down? 
The answer, of course, is no. Wages should be competitive just as consumer prices should be. 
A better way to think of the consumer welfare principle is as concerned with 
maximizing output rather than minimizing price: Namely, the consumer welfare principle in 
antitrust should seek out that state of affairs in which output is maximized, consistent with 
sustainable competition. 
 
Viewing the consumer welfare principle as output maximization has the effects of (1) 
protecting the consumer interest in low prices; (2) protecting intermediaries all the way 
down the distribution chain because high output tends to benefit all of them; (3) protecting 
competitive labor and other supplier markets, because these are also best off when output is 
maximized and wages are unrestrained. In the process, one might add an additional value, 
which is that maximum output is also consistent with most definitions of economic 
productivity or measures of economic growth. To be sure, antitrust analysis is not generally 
concerned with macroeconomics. However, a healthy economy depends on the health of its 
individual markets, and it is far better for antitrust to contribute to that goal rather than 
detract from it. 
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